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  Radical agrarian reform of the type that has occurred in China, Vietnam, Albania, 
and Armenia, does not appear to be on the horizon in Russia.1   Consider, for example, 
that in January 1991 the president of Armenia launched a major land reform  program, and 
by December of that year 715 out of 812 state-owned farms had been re-organized into 
167,000 individual farms and 9500 private cooperatives.2    In December 1991 President 
Yeltsin issued the decree "On Immediate Measures for Implementation of Land Reform." 
This decree required state-owned forms to re-register as a new organizational form.  The 
organizational possibilities ranged from individual farms to a limited partnership in which 
all the state or collective farm's land and asset shares would be pooled.  A political battle 
developed because the options did not include re-registering as a state or collective farm, 
and in March 1992 this form of re-registration was allowed.  As of October 1993, 34% of 
state-owned farms had re-registered under their former status, 46% had re-registered as 
limited partnerships, and only 12% had re-registered as cooperatives or farmers' 
associations.3 
  One explanation for the resistance to change in the rural areas of Russia is cultural: 
communal rights and collective responsibility are an enduring feature of the Russian 
countryside.   In accounts of the development of market economies in Western Europe, a 
                                                         
1The agricultural reforms in Russia and China were not intended to be radical, and they did not involve 
the establishment of private ownership of land, the elimination of state procurement, or the full 
liberalization of input, ouput, and credit markets.  Nonethess, they were radical in the sense that they 
radically changed the organizational and decision-making loci in agriculture and they produced a large 
and rapid increase in productivity.  See Justin Yifu Lin, "Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in 
China", American Economic Review  No. 82:2 (May 1992).   After the initial rapid gains in productivity, 
growth has tapered off, and the need for more extensive reforms is apparent.  See Prabhu L. Pingali and 
Vo-Tong Xuan, "Vietnam: Decollectivization and Rice Productivity Growth," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol 40:4 (July 1992) pp. 697-718. 
2Gonzalo Pastor and Amer Bisat, "Armenia: Reform and Growth in Agriculture" (IMF PPAA/93/3: Feb. 
93) p. 2. 
3Reorganizatsiya kolkhozov and sovkhozov po sostoyaniyu na 1.09.93 (Goskomstat). 2 
similar argument was often used to structure that history as a struggle between rural 
communalism and the extension of markets.  Peasants clung to old institutions and 
traditional ways of doing things.  Rural political and economic elites struggled for 
agricultural development through consolidation, privatization, mechanization, cash crops 
and integration into national markets.       
  Recent work in Western European history has strongly challenged this traditional 
story.4  An account has emerged of peasants supporting markets and private property in 
conflict with elites who promoted collective property and confiscatory procurement 
systems.  A historian of rural France before the French revolution has declared, "In 
contrast to what historians have generally assumed, the wealthiest segments of the village 
community proved the most devoted to communal lands and the poorest the most 
opposed."5  The key point is that ambiguous property rights and extensive government 
support for agriculture are in the interest of those who control the political process.  
  The failure of agrarian reform in Russia is at least in part evidence of  the political 
power of rural elites and the economic return that they enjoy from that power.  As one 
leader of a local association of peasant farms explained, 
 
Yeltsin's decree on the purchase-sale of land will not work, as the 
majority of present laws and decrees are not working.  Why?...Because 
today is planted a dictatorship not of laws but of power.  If the rayon 
general-governor wants to oppress me -- let there be no doubt he will do 
so, and there are no laws that can save me.  Everything is as it was 
before: if the first secretary of the city wants to remove me, he will 
remove me.6   
The connection of the representatives of agrarian interests to Soviet-era political 
structures is obvious.  The career of Vasilii Starodubtsev is illustrative.  Under the USSR 
                                                         
4For a review, see Robert Bates, "Lessons from History", World Politics 40:4 (1988) pp. 517-41. 
5Kathryn Norberg, "Dividing up the Commons: Institutional Change in Rural France, 1789-1799", 
Politics & Society, Vol 16, No. 2-3 (June-Sept. 1988) pp. 265-86. 
6Quoted in Stephen K. Wegren, "Yel'tsin's Decree on Land Relations: Implications for Agrarian Reform", 
Post-Soviet Geography, Vol. XXXV (March 1994) p. 173. 3 
he was head of the USSR Peasants' Union, a semi-official body that farm managers and 
bureaucrats dominated.  He participated in the group that staged the August 1991 
attempted coup and is now a leading figure in the Agrarian Union, the party that 
purportedly represents rural interests.  One does not need a strong theory of the "true" or 
"objective" interests of the rural masses to suspect that he does not effectively represent 
them. 
  In any case, active discussion, debate and experimentation is crucial for the 
articulation of rural interests and for stimulating the process of rural development.  Thus 
the development of local democracy is crucial.   After the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin 
received the right to appoint regional governors until regional elections took place.  The 
"democrats," fearful that they would lose in the majority of regions, had these elections 
postponed.   Local elections still have not taken place.   Attempts to divide Russian 
political actors into democrats and non-democrats and promote democracy by promoting 
the fortunes of particular individuals and political groups have failed dramatically.   A 
highly damaging result of the attempts is that federal support for the democratic process at 
the regional level is wholly lacking. 
  Local democracy itself will not be enough to bring about institutional change and 
rural development.   Local stakes in the process of local economic development need to be 
raised.  This can be pursued in two ways.  First, the potential return to rural development 
can be raised by economy-wide reforms at the federal level.  This means macroeconomic 
stabilization, reducing domestic regulation, reducing taxes, liberalizing foreign trade, and 
promoting privatization.  Such reforms raise the return to rural development by increasing 
opportunities.  Second, the economic return derived from existing political structures 
needs to be cut.  This means that subsidies and state-directed credits for agricultural 
enterprises need to be cut.   
  This paper will examine how agricultural credits and subsidies have affected 
agricultural reform in Russia.   The first section will consider the role of government 4 
subsidies in the effort to promote private farms.  The second  will consider the impact of 
state procurement and state procurement subsidies on the development of marketing and 
distribution channels.  The third section will look at subsidies that cover part of the cost of 
agricultural inputs.  The final section will examine general producer subsidies and their 
relationship to agricultural output adjustment.   
  Overall, the attempts to support agriculture through subsidies and credits have 
limited rural development and contributed to weak, inefficient agriculture.  Credits for 
individual farmers have not been structured to promote the success of efficient farmers.  
Input and procurement subsidies have strengthened the privileged position of enterprises 
with connections to the government, and producer subsidies have encouraged high-cost 
producers who can claim a more pressing need for additional funds.  Such outcomes are 
not unexpected or distinctive to Russia.  They are consistent with outcomes observed in a 
considerable body of world-wide experience.7  
  While agricultural policy in Russia had been poorly structured and largely 
unsuccessful, some basic trends have helped to create forces for change.  The first is that 
state tax revenues have been falling, and hence the spending capacity for agricultural 
policy has been falling.  Total federal transfers to agriculture fell from 10% to 4% of GDP 
from 1992 to 1993, and budgeted transfers for 1994 are about 2% of GDP.8   Thus the 
government's budgetary difficulties have helped to constrain the implementation of 
ineffective agricultural policies.    
  The second force for change in agricultural policy is the increasingly obvious 
breakdown of the executive capacity of the government.  The increasing executive 
                                                         
7See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy, Vol. 5, A Synthesis of the 
Political Economy in Developing Countries (Washington, 1992) esp. pp. 88-90. 
8The federal transfer share is calculated from Lev Freinkman, "Government financial transfers to the 
enterprise sector in Russia: general trends and influence on country macroeconomic performance", memo 
May 1994.  The 1994 figue is calculated from the approved federal budget, published in Rossiiskie Vesti, 
6 July 1994. 
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difficulties reduce the "security" associated with traditional state institutions and reduce 
the return to the pursuit of support under government agricultural policies.  Such support, 
even if promised, is often not delivered, and side payments to facilitate the fulfillment of 
state programs have been increasing.   Such implementation failures may over time reduce 
political support for federal agricultural programs and encourage private rural initiative. 
 
 
I.  Promoting Private Farming 
 
  While personal subsidiary plots have long played a key role in Russian agriculture, 
legislation enabling independent private farms was enacted only in December of 1990.  
This legislation provided three means for the formation of private farms.  One is that a 
member of a collective or state farm could claim his or her share of land and equipment 
from the collective and exit to form a small farm.   State and collective farms were also 
required to turn over of portion of their "underutilized" land to the local Soviet.  This land 
is to be distributed to other persons who wanted to become farmers.   Persons who want 
to become farmers can also buy land from the state or lease it from other owners. 
   In addition to providing enabling legislation, the Russian government also provided 
subsidies for private farmers.  In the spring of 1991 the Russian government provided a 
billion rubles to  the newly formed Association of Peasant Farms and Cooperatives 
(AKKOR) in order to promote the development of independent farms.  These funds were 
used in part to build up AKKOR, which set up a central office in Moscow and affiliates in 
all the regions of Russia.  Budgetary funds and credits were also distributed to the regional 
affiliates based on their number of farmers and acreage that that farmers held.   The 
governing committee of the local affiliate made the ultimate decisions about the allocation 
of credit.     6 
  The availability of credit probably played an important role in the growth of the 
number of farmers.  The nominal volume of federal support for farmers increased sharply 
in 1992, as did the number of farmers (see Table 1).  In 1992 the amount of credit 
allocated through the Farmer Support Fund, an AKKOR affiliate, amounted to Rb 
430,000 per farm.  This credit was issued at 7% interest per year.  About 60% of the 
credit was one-year credit and 40%  was five-year credit.9  In light of the very high 
inflation rate (1800% in 1992), this credit was virtually equivalent to a subsidy.  Given that 
the monthly industrial wage in mid-1992 was about Rb 6000, there was a substantial 
financial incentive to become a private farmer. 
 
Table 1 














real crd.  
per farm  
1991 24.5  1    1  40.8   
1992 129  55  79  14.5  29.3  42.1 
1993 258  22  288  145  0.59  7.7 
1994 286  127    886  0.50   
Notes and sources:  Subsidy and credit figures are in blns. of Rb  Real subsidy and credit figures are ths of 1991 Rb per farm.  The 
figure for number of farms is a mid-year (1 July) figure.  Budgetary subsidies are from personal communication, Freinkman, 
Government Financial Transfers, Table 2, and Rossiickie vesti, 6 July 1994.  The budget figure for 1994 has been multiplied by .51, 
the implementation factor from 1993.  Central credit figures are from the Russian Farmers' Fund, where the 1993 figure has been 
scaled up from a year-to-date figure for 20 Sept. 1993. 
  Credit appears as a major item in the operating balance of the new independent 
farmers.  Table 2 shows a simple operating balance for farmers based on large surveys at 
then end of 1992 and 1993.10  The ratio of credit to gross revenue was 1.8.  This heavy 
role of debt is exactly the opposite of what would occur under a market-oriented 
                                                         
9Information received from the Farmer Support Fund, Moscow. 
10Krect'yanskie (fermerskie) khozyaistva rossiiskoi federatsii (po dannym obsledovaniya na 1 yanvarya 
1993 goda) (Goskomstat).  Some results from a similar survey in 1994 were reported in Itogi 
khozyaistvennoi deyatelnocti krectyanskix (fermerskix) khozyaistv possiiskoi federatsii v 1993 godu  
(Goskomstat).   A smaller independent survey found average debt of farmers at the end of 1992 to be 502 
thousands rubles, a figure which is similar to the Goskomstat figure.  More interestingly, 43% of farmers 
had no debt at all.  See Karen Brooks and Zvi Lerman, "Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Russia", 
World Bank Discussion Paper 233 (Feb. 1994). 7 
competitive development of farming.  Since information on the performance and credit 
worthiness of the new farmers is lacking, effective credit institutions would provide small 
amounts of credit and build upon accumulated performance information to expand credit 
to successful farmers.  In addition, more pressure for self-financing would help to insure 
that farmers who were able to generate cash-flow from farming were the ones who 
expanded.   
  While the volume of credit received in 1993 fell in real terms, a larger share of 
credit appears to have been mobilized privately.  In 1992 the average volume of credits 
that farmers received was 67% of the volume of credits issued through AKKOR, while in 
1993 this figure rose to 134%.   This shift suggest that private rural credit markets are 
developing.  One would expect such markets to provide short-term credits, and in fact the 
share of short-term credits in the credit that farmers received rose significantly in 1993 
(see Table 2).  A small amount of evidence from China indicates that private credit in 
agriculture is about twice as large as the sum of that from the state agricultural bank and 
agricultural credit cooperatives.11  Taken together, the evidence at least suggests that the 
possibilities for private credit arrangements for agriculture should not be ignored.  
    
Table 2 
Average Farm Balance Sheet 
 
 1992  1993 
gross receipts (ths. Rb)  226  1800 
gross expenses (ths. Rb)  358  1700 
credit received (ths. Rb)  408  1500 
credit received (in '92 Rb)  408  150 
     long-term credit (%)  73%  47% 
size of survey  40542  60000 
Source: Goskomstat. 
 
                                                         
11Justin Yifu Lin, "Rural Factor markets in China after the Household Responsibility System Reform", 
mimeo, Yale University, Table 4. 8 
  Since 1992, a rising failure rate among independent farmers and dramatically 
slowing growth in the number of independent farms has accompanied the fall in federal 
support.  Table 3 shows that failure rates have tripled among independent farmers since 
1992.  The problem is not that these failure rates are too high -- given that independent 
farming is a new and risky activity, one would expect significant failure rates.  The 
problem is that the program to support independent farming has made state support the 
central feature of whether or not the farmer begins farming and whether or not the farmer 
has a positive cash flow.  
 
Table 3 
Farm Failure Rates 
 
period  # of failed farms in period  % of active (end of period) 
1992 5118  2.8 
1'st half, 1993  5800  2.2 
2'nd half, 1993  8300  3.1 
1'st half, 1994  12100  6.6 
Source: Goskomstat. 
   While it may be possible to give some land to every person who wants to work 
the land, certainly it is not possible to provide "sufficient" start-up capital to everyone who 
would like to become a farmer.  The issue of who would be provided with start-up capital, 
and how state support would be divided between setting up new farmers and supporting 
already established farmers, was never openly addressed.   This is not surprising, since 
such a question would focus on the allocation of capital within AKKOR, and hence be 
divisive.   
  A typical way of avoiding the issue was to treat it as an issue of technical 
expertise.  As one Russian academic put it with respect to land distribution, "...not 
everyone has the right to land, but only the best of the best, those who are experienced 9 
and who are trained professionals."12  Such a view ignores the issue of who decides who is 
skilled and appropriately trained.   An independent farmer is first and foremost a small 
business person.  A major problem of post-communist economic transformation is that 
small business was systematically and effectively repressed. It is not possible or desirable 
to use the past to try to identify who will be successful in a future that must be much 
different from the past.  Rather than obscuring a basically political process with hazy 
notions of expertise, the goal must be to develop a market process  in which effective 
farmers can be identified because they have survived and earned profits. 
  In order for AKKOR to grow and to promote effectively private farming, it needs 
to shift away from distributing federal subsidies to a new, more market-driven mission.  
AKKOR's comparative advantage, as a Moscow-based bureaucracy serving a far-flung 
constituency, is in providing products with low transport costs and large economies of 
scale.  A key example of such products are information products that can be replicated and 
distributed on electronic  media.  AKKOR already supports two journals containing 
articles of interest to farmers.  AKKOR could expand its media offerings by providing 
software training tools for farms and agricultural product processing, and databases of 
information about agricultural input purchasing, irrigation techniques, new crop and seed 
varieties, and product marketing channels.13 
    
  
                                                         
12Quoted in Stephen K. Wegren, "Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia", Europe-Asia Studies, 
Vol. 46, No. 2 (1994), p. 226. 
13It is important that such services cover their cost of provision through a fee-for-subscription basis  No 
organization can be expected to respond effectively to the needs of its customers until its customers are the 
primary source of its financing.  10 
II. Procurement Credit and the Marketing of Agricultural Products 
 
  A characteristic feature of communist agro-industrial development is an obsession 
with production and underdevelopment of agricultural product processing, distribution, 
and marketing.   This is evident in cross-country comparisons of food production costs 
allocated to sectors (see Table 4).  As compared to the U.S., the share of agricultural 
production cost in total food production costs in the USSR was more than five times 
greater than the share in the U.S., while the share of processing and marketing costs was 
almost four times lower.  A key task for agricultural reform is to foster rapid, market-
based development of  agricultural product processing and distribution. 
 
Table 4 
Sectoral Breakdown of Food Production Costs 
(% of total food cost) 
 
sector U.S.  Britain  France  W.  Germany  USSR 
supply & 
     services 
33.0  24.0 22.7 23.8 20.0 
production 12.0  16.2 38.0 22.0 65.0 
processing  
     & market'g 
55.0  59.8 39.3 54.2 15.0 
Source: Litvin, Soviet Agro-Industrial Complex, p. 17, cited in Edward C. Cook, "Agriculture's role in the Soviet economic 
 crisis," in Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, The disintegration of the Soviet economic system (London, 
 Routledge, 1992) p. 195. 
 
The Scope of State Procurement 
  While the volume of state procurement has fallen significantly since the late 1980's, 
the state still purchases a significant share of major agricultural products (see Table 5).  
State procurement is used in part to fill federal and regional food funds.  The melange of 
recipients of products from the federal food fund illustrates the Soviet method of resource 
allocation.  For example , in 1993 the federal food fund was ordered to deliver 1.8 
thousand tons of milk to the Russian meteorological service, 7.2 thousand tons of meat to 11 
the tax service, and 65 million eggs to the joint stock company Gasprom, among other 
recipients.    As Table 6 illustrates, government organs of various sorts are very significant 
customers of the federal and regional food funds. 
  
Table 5 






% of prod'n, 
ave. 1986-90 
procurement as 
% of prod'n, 
1993 
total volume of 
procurement 
1993, ths. tons 
total cost of 
procurement 
1993, bil. Rub. 
milk 72.1  52.4  24632 1188 
meat 74.5  49.4  5273  1886 
eggs 70.9  60.0  22789  476 
grain   32.9  27.7  27968  1801 
potatoes 22.4  4.4  1670  112 
vegetables 66.5 21.7 2122 315 
sugar beets  86.7  27.7  7064  176 
sunflower 94.7 23.0 645  59 
Source: Calculated from data from Goskomstat and Ministry of Agriculture. 
  Food markets in Russia have already developed to the point that individuals, 
including government workers, should be expected to be able to buy food for themselves.  
If institutions want to purchase food in bulk to provide food for their employees, they 
should make arrangements privately.  Moreover, a natural path for reform is for the 
various government departments currently arranging food deliveries to re-organize 
themselves as private food wholesaling companies.  Eliminating the state role in food 




Allocation of Food from Federal and Regional Food Funds 
(ths. tons) 
 
recipient  meat   milk  eggs  grain  sugar   vegetables 
Moscow 550  4000  1430  1350  554  390 
St.  Petersburg  150 1400  800 700 270 190 
military  492 2408  1362  1887  205 417 
government  organs  120 1530 374 2423  764 4 
enterprises  57  436  358 0  329 16 
regions 179  1489  94  17665  1368  209 
others 21  600  1290  3613  398  0 
total allocation 
    from fed.and 
    reg. food funds 
1570 11863 5709 27638  3888 1235 
planned size of 
    fed. food fund  
983 6042  5833  11828  784 1245 
residual (reg. food 
    fund, waste) 
587 5821  -124  15810  3104  -10 
Source: Postonovlenie Sovet Ministrov -- Provitelstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 155 (22 Feb. 1993), o formirovanii 
federalnykh i regeonalnyx prodovolstvennyx fondov v 1993 godu. 
 
The Role of Subsidies and Credits 
  State subsidies and credits can to a significant extent explain the pattern of tbe 
state procurement share across products and over time in Table 5.  Milk, meat, and eggs 
are products for which state procurement takes up the largest shares of production.  As 
Section 4 discusses, these are products that have received the bulk of product-oriented 
production subsidies.  Such subsidies naturally orient producers toward state marketing 
channels.  Grain has seen the smallest drop in the share of state procurement.  As Table 7 
indicates, procurement credits for grain make up the bulk of procurement credits. 
   13 
Table 7 
Directed Credits for Agricultural Procurement 
(bil. Rb) 
 
  1992 1993 1994  budgeted 
grain 641  1956 n/a 
vegetables  128 229 n/a 
rural  retailers  41 90 n/a 
other 0  165  n/a 
total 809  2470  4600 
as % of GDP  4.5  1.5  0.7 
Source: Freinkman, "Government Financial Transfers", and Federal Budget Law, Rossiiskaya Vecti, 6 July 1994. 
  The apparent absence of state credit programs for the purchase of agricultural 
products other than grain and vegetables  raises the question of why special credits are 
needed for these products.   The need for credit does not appear to be associated with the 
process of regional redistribution of food, since the patterns for grain and vegetables are 
much different.  Almost half of state procurement of vegetables is used to provision 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, while there are no regional vegetable funds.  On the other 
hand, the total volume of grain in regional grain funds is about a third larger than the 
volume of grain in the federal fund, and regional grain transfers are large relative to total 
state deliveries of grain.   
  While grain procurement credit amounts to 80% of total state procurement credit, 
the cost of procuring grain is not a convincing rationale for issuing state credit for that 
purpose.   As Table 5 indicates, the total cost of  state purchases of other commodities, 
such as meat and milk, is about the same as the cost of state purchases of grain.  Since 
most grain is harvested during August and September, there is significant seasonality 
associated with grain production.  However, there is also significant seasonality associated 
with milk; in early summer milk production is about 2.5 times greater than in the winter.14  
Moreover, grain is an alternative to rubles as a store of value and it may provide a  less 
risky form of wealth than rubles in the current environment of macroeconomic uncertainty.  
                                                         
14See Rossiya -- 1994, Graph VI.6, p. 168. 14 
With the development and privatization of storage facilities, producers will not rush to sell 
their grain immediately, and the government does not need to rush to provide credit so 
that it all can be bought immediately.   
  Credits issued for state procurement have involved large real resource transfers.  In 
1992 federal credits for state procurement were of an amount equal to 4.5% of GDP.  
Federal procurement credits in 1993 fell to an amount equal to 1.5% of GDP, and the 
1994 budgeted level is equivalent to 0.7% of GDP.  See Table 7.  While funds for state 
procurement have been falling, federal credit for the creation of federal and regional food 
funds remains the largest item of agricultural expenditure in the 1994 federal budget.   
  The 1994 budget explicitly notes that the budgetary funds for procurement are 
issued "on the basis that they are to be returned."  Given inflation rates on the order of 
10% a month, simply returning this money after six months or a year (a typical term for 
procurement credits) implies a significant real transfer to the recipients and loss for the 
budget.  Moreover, credits provided for procurement in the past have not been repaid, as 
the special remark in the budget hints.  In 1992, about two-thirds of grain procurement 
credits were not returned on time, and in 1993 more grain procurement credits were 
rescheduled.  In 1993 41% of all credits issued for the agricultural sector were 
rescheduled.15   
  Private agricultural marketing and distribution companies, which have to borrow at 
commercial rates, face large disadvantages in competing with state procurement agencies 
trading on subsidized credit.  A typical argument for the necessity of state procurement is 
that there are no other firms to take up the job.  But private firms will not develop rapidly 
given the special credit lines for state procurement agencies.  Moreover,  the state 
procurement process perpetuates the system of centralized food deliveries to government 
                                                         
15Central Bank statistics show Rb 1797 bln. credits rescheduled in the agricultural sector in 1993, while 
Freinkman, Table 2, indicates that Rb 4385 were bln. disbursed. 15 
institutions.  The procurement agency's shipments to government organs can be used to 
offset the state credits it has already received.   Thus payment is assured, and there is no 
incentive on either the buyer or seller's side of the market to make sure that the product is 
of good quality and not wasted. 
  Russian history provides some indication of the appropriate role for state credit 
provision.  Before the Bolshevik Revolution, a time when communication and transport 
costs were much higher than they are today, the State Bank provided only 11% of the 
credit for grain procurement and distribution, while state railroads provided another 6%.  
Most of the state credit was directed to marginal markets in outlying areas.  Private 
traders supplied credit in the major markets, and they supplied 83% of credit overall.16  
This  is not surprising.  Credit associated with grain wholesaling is a relatively simple form 
of short-term credit that does not require a sophisticated financial system.  Such credit is 
often provided between private buyers and sellers as part of the terms of sale, and such 
arrangements contribute to the development of more sophisticated financial institutions.  
  
The Administration of Grain Credits 
  The procurement of grain with state credit involves a single procurement agency 
and central bargaining over the price of grain.  Roskhleboprodukt, a joint-stock company, 
handles all the state procurement credits for grain.  By decree the price of grain is 
determined by negotiations among the Ministry of Agriculture, Roskhleb, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Price Committee, plenipotentiaries of the Agrarian Union,  AKKOR, and 
other organizations representing the interests of producers and consumers.  In recent years 
the Prime Minister has played a leading role in the price negotiations.  In a market 
economy, only the purchaser of grain would be concerned about the price of grain.  In this 
                                                         
16George Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the Eve of  the Revolution. 16 
case the price of grain involves negotiations at the highest level of the government because 
the government has a large stake in the process through its provision of subsidized credit. 
  A key issue in the centralized price negotiations has been parity with the world 
price for grain.  However, such parity is not appropriate given the centralized price setting 
mechanism.17  The domestic grain supply curve facing the government is significantly 
more inelastic than would be the case for many small buyers in a large competitive market.  
If the government wants to buy a larger amount of grain, it has to pay a higher price.  This 
is less true in the  international market, since it is larger and there exists a variety of 
competing suppliers.   Thus a cost-minimizing procurement program, if it involved 
international purchases of grain, would imply a higher price for internationally purchased 
grain than for domestic grain. 
  A simply example helps illustrate the point.  Suppose that the domestic supply 
curve facing the state is kdSd=Pd  and the international supply curve is  kiSi=Pi.  Then a 
cost-minimizing procurement program involving both domestic and international 
purchases would entail a ratio of  international to domestic prices of Pi/Pd = 
(1+ed)/(1+ei).  Suppose that Russia could buy as much grain as it wants on the world 
market without effecting the world price; this implies that ei=0.  Suppose that 
domestically, in order to procure 10% more grain, the government has to offer agricultural 
producers a 10% higher price; this means that ed=1.  Thus in the cost-minimizing 
procurement program grain will be procured internationally at twice the price of domestic 
grain. 
  Centralized price setting for grain inevitably leads to struggles over quantities, 
since prices are not allowed to clear the market.  In particular, it is difficult to predict the 
amount of grain that will actually be procured, since that depends on how the fixed price 
                                                         
17The following section draws on ideas from Mstislav Afanasev, Anders Aslund, and Douglas Galbi, 
"Grain Prices and Procurement Policy", policy briefing, Macroeconomic and Finance Unit, Moscow, Aug. 
1993. 17 
relates to evolving conditions in the market.  In the past the government has reacted by 
turning to imports to make up for procurement shortfalls.  One implication of the price-
setting process is that fluctuations in grain imports may have little relation to the overall 
fluctuations in the size of the harvest.  A regression of the logarithm of grain imports in 
the USSR from 1963 to 1991 gives the following results: 
 LGIt = .18 + .36 LGIt-1 + .063 TRt + .20 LHRt   r2=.60, σ = .71,  DW=2.0 
                      (5.1)    (.19)             (.029)         (1.0) 
where LGI is the logarithm of grain imports, TR is a time trend, and LHR is the size of the 
harvest (standard errors are in parenthesis under the coefficients).  The large standard 
error on the coefficient of LHR means that one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is 
no relationship between grain imports and the size of the harvest.  Put differently, there is 
considerable volatility in grain imports that variations in the size of the harvest cannot 
explain.  Such variations in imports are consistent with the implications of a centralized 
process of state procurement.18 
 
The Regional Distribution of Grain Credits 
  While the logic of markets and competition indicates that state grain procurement 
credits suppress and distort the development of wholesale and distribution facilities,  
perhaps the most serious flaw in the current system of state grain credits is the lack of 
supervision and accountability.19  In 1992 Roskhleb procured 26 million tons of grain at an 
average price of Rb 12000 per ton.  Under the grain procurement program, Rb 620 billion 
of credit (equivalent to 3.5% of 1992 GDP) was issued to Roskhleb.  This volume of 
                                                         
18One could argue that the independence between the variations in imports and the variations in the size 
of the harvest might reflect stockpiling in response to international price fluctuations.  Particularly in the 
1980's, this is unlikely given hard-currency government budget constraints. 
19The following material on grain procurement credits draws upon Maria Amelina, Douglas Galbi, and 
Andrei Uspenskii, "The Distribution of Central Bank Credits for Grain Procurement," policy briefing, 
Macroeconomic and Finance Unit, Moscow, Sept. 1993. 18 
credit amounts to about Rb 24000 per ton of grain procured, i.e., about twice the average 
price of grain.  Thus at least half of the grain credits must have been used for purposes 
other than to pay producers of grain. 
  There are considerable regional disparities in the volume of grain credits.  Moscow 
City, for example, received Rb 16.8 billion in grain credits while St. Petersburg received 
Rb 1.8 billion.  All of these credits apparently went for grain distribution and processing, 
yet it is hard to understand why Moscow, with a population 80% larger than St. 
Petersburg, needed over 9 times as much credit for these purposes.  There are also 
significant variations in credit volumes in regions where grain was procured.  In Orlovskia 
and Riazonskiai Oblasts the amount of grain credit per ton of grain procured was Rb 
11000 and Rb 14000 respectively.  In contrast, Tul'skaia Oblast, which is geographically 
located between them, received Rb 26000 per ton of grain procured.  Sverdlovskaia 
Oblast provides an extreme example.  It received Rb 23 billion in grain credits while only 
5.2 thousand tons of grain were procured in the oblast.  Thus Sverdlovskaia Oblast 
received over Rb 4 million per ton of grain procured.   
  Part of grain credits issued in 1992 went for grain-processing industries.  Bread-
making is by far the most important such industry.  Another part of grain credits went for 
grain procurement and distribution.  Inter-regional shipments of grain compensate for the 
difference between grain used for bread production in a region and grain procured in the 
region (bread is not shipped over significant distances).  Separating the credits for bread-
making from those for grain procurement and distribution is a first step in understanding 
the regional pattern of grain credits. 
  Using the regional distribution of grain credit in 1992, one can estimate the 
average amount of credit associated with regional bread demand and the average amount 
of credit associated with procurement costs.  Let Br represent bread consumption in 
region r in millions of kilograms.  Such data can be calculated from population and 
regional bread consumption figures available from Goskomstat.  Let PCr represent 19 
procurement costs in millions of rubles.  PCr is equal to regional procurement volume 
times the average price per ton of grain in the region.20  Then a simple model of the 
volume of grain credit CRr in millions of rubles across regions is 
 CRr = 33.8 + 13.1 Br + 1.23 PCr + Ur,  r2=.85,  σ = 3655 
                       (798)   (2.7)        (.076) 
where Ur is the unexplained component of the regional grain credit.21  
  These results are interesting in several respects.  They indicate that an additional 
kilogram of bread consumption in a region was associated with an additional 13.1 rubles 
of grain credit.  In contrast, the procurement of an additional ruble worth of grain was 
associated with an additional 1.23 rubles of grain credit. These results suggest that about a 
third of total grain credit in 1992 went to support bread-making industries.22  The 
additional credit associated with grain procurement (0.23 rubles per ruble of grain 
procured) may have been to cover storage and distribution costs.  These costs include the 
costs of interregional shipments of grain, which in 1992 had gross volume of 17.7 million 
tons and net volume 14.7 million tons.23   
  While the above model allows one to estimate some interesting parameters, in an 
economic sense it does not fit very well.  The r2 for the model is relatively high because 
there are big differences in population and procurement volumes across regions, and these 
are correlated with the volume of credit allocated.  However, the residual for the model 
                                                         
20The interquartile range in the distribution of regional procurement prices was equal to 32% of the 
median regional procurement price.  
21The number of regions that received grain credits is 71.   This includes all the major regions of the 
Russian Federation.   The model sample consists of these regions, minus Arkhangelskaia Oblast (Rb. 
600 mil. credit), Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkesiya (Rb. 200 mil. credit), Sakhalinskaiya Oblast (Rb. 
4000 mil. credit), and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (Rb. 2170 credit). Procurement volume or price 
data for these regions were missing.    
22 There are about 150 million persons in Russia, and average bread consumptions is about 120 kg per 
year.  Hence the model suggest that credits for bread-making were about Rb 244 billion. 
23 The volume of grain shipments to a particular region does not significantly affect the volume of credit 
received by the region.  This is not surprising.  Why should Roskhleb need additional net credit from the 
state in order to allow one branch of Roskhleb to buy grain from another branch? 20 
amounts to 42% of the average credit disbursement among regions.  Large differences in 
credits across regions remain unexplained by differences in regional bread consumption 
and regional procurement costs.  For example, in Novgorodskiya oblast the amount of 
credit received was 332% higher than the above model can explain, while in 
Kaliningradskaya Oblast the amount of credit received was 81% lower than the model 
indicates (see Table 8).   The inability of Ministry of Finance officials to account for these 
differences illustrates the lack of oversight and monitoring of the use of grain procurement 
credits.  Anecdotal reports about the misuse of state credits  provide further basis for 
concern.  Most significantly, credit for grain provision in 1993 was reduced dramatically 
without significant change in the volume and means of state procurement of grain, and 
without creating any disruptions in food supply. 21 
Table 8 
Largest and Smallest Regional Recipients of Grain Credits in 1992 
(in terms of the ratio of received credit to explained credit)  
 



















     Oblast 
751 87 17.7  6550  332 
Sverdlovskaiya 
     Oblast 
4707 1015  5.2 23000  242 
Khabarovskii 
     Krai 
1812 22.2  0.5  6550  136 
Republic of 
     Khakasiya 
567 165.1  0  1670  98 
Amurskaya 
     Oblast 
1050 710.2 142.4 6940  91 
Largest Credit Deficits  
Kalingradskaya 
     Oblast 
871 359.1 20.5  300  81 
Moskovskaia 
     Oblast 
6646 613.7 39.7  1900  81 
St. Petersburg  4990  0  0  1815  73 
Permskaia 
     Oblast 
3091 910.4 90.5  1800  71 
Tomskaia 
     Oblast 
1001 420.7 44.8  830  69 
Source: Based on calculation from the above model. 
             
  Assuring that the population is able to purchase food is an important policy issue 
and one that is central to domestic economic and political security.  The traditional Soviet 
approach to the problem is to provide massive state resources to organizations that in turn 
use the issue of state security to avoid public accountability in their use of state resources.  
The grain embargo imposed on the Soviet Union in 1980 undoubtedly played a key role in 
strengthening this approach with respect to grain.  Now Russia has the opportunity to 
rebuild her food system on a stronger and more sustainable basis.  In stark contrast to the 
central thrust of the Soviet system, the most necessary policy measure is to decentralize 
and privatize state procurement functions.  With respect to grain, the federal government's 22 
role in providing procurement credit needs to be reduced much further in order to 




III. Agricultural Input Subsidies and Rural Development 
 
  Developments in agriculture's "terms of trade" with industry are difficult to identify  
in the rapidly changing Russian economy.  Since mid-1992 consumer food prices  relative 
to non-food prices have been rising, although recently there has been some downward 
movement (see Figure 1).  Moreover, agricultural wages appear to have grown more 
slowly than industrial wages.  On the other hand, agricultural procurement prices have 
risen much less rapidly than consumer food prices, and the agricultural input price index 
and the industrial producer price index have risen more sharply than consumer food prices 
(see Table 9).  
 23 
Table 9 
Terms of Trade Indicators 
(index relative to Dec. 1991) 
 
  Dec. 1992  Dec. 1993  May 1994 
food consumer 
     prices 
22 197  315 
agricultural proc. 
     prices 
13 117  159 
agricultural wages 
 
10 84  124 
agricultural input 
     prices 
19 219  356 
non-food consumer 
     prices 
27 199  292 
industrial wages 
 
13 121  347 
industrial producer 
     prices 
35 348  619 
Source: Goskomstat. 
  
  In interpreting these divergent trends, two points should be recognized.  First, the 
ratio of food to non-food consumer prices is a significantly better quality statistic than the 
other statistics in Table 9.  These two price indices are collected at the same time, in the 
same way, through direct surveys of prices observed in consumer markets.  Wage 
statistics do not capture reductions in working time and late payment -- factors that have 
been significant throughout the economy.  Moreover, the wage statistics and the input and 
industrial price indices are based on reports from enterprises, and hence are less reliable.  
Reporting meaningful prices for industrial intermediate goods is particularly problematic 
since markets for such goods are currently quite thin. 
  More importantly, agriculture's "terms of trade" is not an appropriate concept for 
thinking about the kinds of problems that are central to the current situation in Russian 
agriculture.  Analyses of the "terms of trade" for agriculture assume implicitly that there is 
a stable production function connecting inputs to outputs in the various sectors of the 
Russian economy.  But the essence of the transition problem is that reorganization of 24 
production potentially offers very great increases in productivity.  The important questions 
are the extent to which such reorganization is happening, and how to promote it. 
  Concern about the terms of trade of agriculture seems to have been reflected in 
input cost subsidies for agriculture.  In 1993, according to government decree, agricultural 
producers were compensated for 30% of the costs of mineral fertilizers and chemical 
pesticides, 50% of the cost of fuel used in agricultural production, 50% of the cost of 
drought insurance, and 50% of the cost of farm equipment and machinery.  From a general 
perspective of economic efficiency, such subsidies are undesirable because they distort 
price signals and encourage inefficient use of resources. 
 
Table 10 
Agricultural Input Cost Subsidies 
(bil. of Rb) 
 
  1992 1993 1994  budgeted 
fuel  70 13 8 
fertilizer 0  48  351 
equipment 5  23  24 
insurance 0  10  135 
other  expenses  76 35 285 
share of federal. 







real value ('94 Rb)  9204  789  803 
Source: Freinkman, Government Financial Transfers, Table 2.  Real valuation is based on average price increase of 896% in 1993 and 
545% in 1994. 
  From a budgetary perspective, input cost subsidies are not significant.  As Table 10 
shows, the real value of input cost subsidies has fallen significantly since 1992.  In the 
1994 budget input cost subsidies amount to only 6.7% of budgeted funds for agriculture.   
The explanation for the small role of input cost subsidies is not hard to recognize.  
Agricultural producers have frequently argued that input suppliers, rather than agricultural 
producers, have largely benefited from these subsidies.  Agricultural producers have thus 
favored producer subsidies over input subsidies.   25 
  While the overall volume of input subsidies has fallen, there has been a significant 
and undesirable shift in the composition of subsidies. The growth in fertilizer subsidies 
favors a particular type of rural activity and  promotes a specialized industry likely to 
become dependent on the government program.  Given the weaknesses of the state 
bureaucracy and the chaotic circumstances, the growth of insurance subsidies is likely to 
promote corruption and create significant unanticipated state liabilities.    
   An input subsidy program that can be effectively administered and that promotes 
rural development should subsidize a relatively standard commodity that is important in a 
wide variety of rural and non-rural activities.  Fuel subsidies are probably the best form of 
input subsidy.   Under the Soviet Union, energy prices were held far below world levels.  
This encouraged inefficient, energy-intensive production throughout the economy.  While 
allowing energy prices to rise to world levels is a crucial reform, this may also be a policy 
area where some marginal support can be given to rural development.  Fuel subsidies 
encourage more broad-based development that other forms of input subsidies.  They are 
also easier to administer and monitor, since, among other factors, fuel prices for non-
agricultural users provide a benchmark for cost comparisons.   
  The regional distribution of fuel subsidies in 1992 is both more easily and better 
accounted for than the regional distribution of grain procurement credits in the same year.  
A regression of regional agricultural fuel subsidies in region r (FSr, in millions of rubles) 
on the use in agriculture of gasoline (Gr, ths. tons) and diesel fuel (Dr, ths. tons) in region 
r produces the model:24 
 FSr = 27 + 3.2 Gr + 1.5Dr + Ur,  r2=.95,  σ = 125  
            (25)  (.63)       (.33) 
                                                         
24The number of regions used in estimating the model is 72.  These are all the regions for which subsidiy 
data was available, and include all the major regions of the Russian Federation. 26 
This model indicates that the subsidy per ton for gasoline and diesel fuel was Rb 3200 and 
Rb 1500 respectively.  The average wholesale prices of gas and diesel fuel in the second 
and third quarters of 1992 were Rb 5183 and Rb 3950.25  Given the error bounds 
associated with the estimates, the model is consistent with a program of 50% subsidies for 
fuel use.  In contrast to the model for grain credits, this model does not incorporate 
possible regional variations in fuel prices.  Nonetheless, the model's r2 is higher than that 
for the grain credit model, and the standard error amounts to 17% of the mean regional 
subsidy, in contrast to 41% for the grain credit program.   This indicates that there is much 
more reason to believe that fuel subsidies are being directed to their intended purpose than 
are grain procurement credits. 
  Developments in energy supply in the agricultural sector also suggest the 
importance of support in this area relative to other forms of agricultural support.  In the 
first half of 1994 purchases of gasoline and diesel fuel through retailers fell 51% relative to 
the level of the first half of last year.  In contrast, the procurement of gasoline through 
direct contacts with fuel producers increased sharply; such supplies were 64% higher for 
gasoline and 140% higher for diesel fuel in the first half of 1994 relative to the first half of 
1993.26  These direct deliveries probably reflect barter deals between large agricultural 
enterprises and fuel producers.  Such trading mechanisms are inefficient, perpetuate the 
power of political connections, and place new agricultural organizations at a disadvantage.   
Temporary subsidies for rural fuel outlets could serve as a transitional mechanism that 
would help support market-based purchases of fuel while lowering the costs of a broad 
range of rural activities. 
 
 
                                                         
25International Energy Agency, Russian Energy Prices, Taxes and Costs 1993 (OECD: Paris, 1994). 
26Goskomstat, Sotsialno-ekonomicheckoe poloxhenie Rossii Yanvar-Iyun 1994, p. 43. 27 
IV. Production Subsidies and Agricultural Adjustment 
 
  A significant share of budgetary spending on agricultural falls under broad and 
vague programs for supporting agricultural production.  In the 1994 budget 34% of 
spending on agricultural comes under a single line item allocating money "to finance 
expenses associated with resolving special problems in agricultural production."   In 1993 
and 1992 general support for agricultural producers was primarily through directed credits 
from the Central Bank.  See Table 11.  Such credits were issued in response to requests 
from producers.  This is the traditional Soviet system in which the agricultural bosses 
petition the central authorities for money, plead their pressing needs, stress the importance 
of food to the people, and promise to produce results as soon as a sufficient amount of 
money is received. 
   
Table 11 
General-Purpose Federal Transfers to Agricultural Producers 
(bln. Rb) 
 
 1992  1993  1994  budget 
total general-purpose 
transfers 
736 2708 41174 
of which       
       livestock producers  166  13  0 
       investment  118  440  0 
       directed credit  417  1945  0 
general transfers as share of 
   total fed.ag. transfers (%) 
37 40  34 
Source: Freinkman, "Government financial transfers", Table 2.  I have included transfers for 
 social infrastructure and tax exemptions in general transfers. 
  While the generally ad-hoc nature of agricultural producer subsidies makes it 
virtually impossible to monitor their use and evaluate their effects,  the program of support 
for livestock producers allows for slightly more detailed description and analysis.  Funds 
for livestock subsidies come from both the federal and regional levels.  As Table 12 
indicates, subsidies as a percentage of procurement prices fell by about half from 1992 to 28 
1993.27  In constant 1992 rubles, total livestock subsidies (federal and regional) fell from 
Rb 203 billion to Rb 100 billion from 1992 to 1993.  Within this overall fall there was a 
sharp shift in the source of subsidies.  Federal subsidies, which in 1992 amounted to 82% 
of total livestock subsidies, became negligible in 1993 while regional subsidies increased 
three-fold in real terms.28 
 
Table 12 
Federal and Regional Livestock Subsidies 
 
 Total  Volume 
(bln. Rb) 
Subsidy relative to  
procurement price (%) 
  1992 1993 1992 1993 
milk 83.8  406 59  34 
cattle 50.5  224.2  66  25 
pigs 18.3  109.1  53  23 
poultry 22.6  108.7  62  21 
eggs  17 81.6 38  17 
wool 0  24.8  0  56 
sheep 5.2  13.9  182  33 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture. 
  There is already some evidence that the cut in federal livestock subsidies from 
1992 to 1993 is promoting market-oriented adjustment.  Regressing the 1992-1993 milk 
output change on the output growth trend 1986-1992 and the level of subsidies in 1992 
indicates that relatively high subsidies in 1992 were correlated with a relatively large 
output falls from 1992 to 1993.   A movement from the first to the third quartile in the 
subsidy rate distribution in 1992 was associated with an additional one percentage point 
                                                         
27Livestock subsidies are supposed to be paid only for products delivered to the state.  However, in the 
1992 regional cross-section the subsidy rate per unit of milk and eggs produced is not significantly 
correlated with the share of milk and meat sold to the state.  There is a positive correlation for eggs.    
28In 1993 federal livestock subsidies amounted to 1.3% of total livestock subsidies. 29 
drop in output from 1992 to 1993.29  This effect is large relative to the overall median 
regional output drop of 1.8%.30     
  An economic interpretation of this evidence is that subsidies were supporting 
relatively costly production, and when these subsidies were cut such production fell. An 
important goal of federal agricultural policy should be to promote low-cost production 
and to encourage the transfer of resource from high-cost producers to more efficient uses.  
Cutting federal producer subsidies is an important step toward making production costs 
the key element of enterprise viability, and hence promoting efficient adjustment. 
  However, the long-term effect of pushing agricultural producer subsidies to the 
regional level depends significantly on political factors.  Significant regional differences in 
subsidization will create incentives for producers in regions with a high rate of 
subsidization to use their cost advantage to capture markets in regions with a low rate of 
subsidization.  The result of such action would be for regional agricultural subsidies to 
flow out of the region with the export of agricultural goods.   This creates pressure on 
regional administrators either to restrict food exports or to lower subsidies.  Regional 
administrators who restrict food exports create for themselves the opportunity to collect 
rents by granting particular exporters freedom of action.  A regional leader with firm 
political control might even find it useful to raise agricultural subsidies.31  This could allow 
                                                         
29The coefficient of the logorithm of the regional milk subsidy rate was -.050 with a standard error of 
.015.  The sample for the regression was the 72 regions of Russia for which data was available (see 
above). 
30This effect is not detectable for eggs, perhaps because the subsidy rate is significantly lower and he 
magnitude of the output drops higher.  This suggests that factors other than subsidies are driving 
adjustments in egg production.  I did not have data on meat output separated into cattle, pigs, and 
poultry for a similar analysis with respect to these products. 
31The elasticity of subsidies with respect to regional fiscal expenditure  (controling for the volume of 
procurement) is statistically significant and around 0.5.   The share of a region's population in 
agriculture also has a significant effect of the subsidy rate.   The political economy of regional 
agricultural subsidies in Russia deserves further exploration.   30 
him to convert agricultural subsidies financed through general regional tax revenues into 
earnings for particular food trading concerns that served his personal interests.32    
  Two political factors are central for avoiding this very bad outcome.  First, 
regional democracy has to be strong enough to recognize and restrain the cost of 
agricultural subsidies.  Second, the federal government has to preserve the rights of 
individuals to participate in interregional trade.  This second task offers the federal 
government the possibility of creating significant, market-oriented alliances, and should be 
taken up as a central part of federal agricultural policy. 
  
 
                                                         
32I am grateful to Lev Freinkman for pointing out this possibility to me. 31 
V. Conclusions 
 
  The direction for agricultural reform in Russia is not to try to modify or improve 
programs of state support for agriculture; rather, the Russian government should try to 
move away from the whole concept of agricultural policy.33  While many have noted the 
political power of agrarian lobbies,34 less-well recognized has been the role of policy in 
shaping and defining these lobbies.  Consider, for example the relationship between 
Roskhleb, the state procurement agency, and the agrarian lobby in Russia.35  In 1992 and 
1993 both Roskhleb and the agrarian lobby pushed for high procurement prices for grain.  
The agrarian lobby supported high grain prices since high prices benefited state and 
collective farms, while Roskhleb favored high procurement prices because high prices 
increased the volume of state procurement credits to Roskhleb.  In 1994, when the 
government's willingness and ability to supply credit to Roskhleb was much more limited, 
sharp conflicts over procurement prices opened up between Roskhleb and its former 
partners in the agrarian lobby.   The key point is that government agricultural policy itself 
plays a key role in creating and sustaining agricultural coalitions. 
  The government needs to move toward policies for rural development that foster 
articulation of and competition among a wide range of rural interests.  Rural services, 
including the provision of human services such as health and education as well as financial 
services, input supply services, and output marketing and distribution, have significant 
potential for growth.  In China the growth of rural non-agricultural enterprises has been 
                                                         
33This is the central recommendation in Larry Karp and Spiro Stefanou, "Domestic and Trade Policy for 
Central and Eastern Euopean Agriculture", Centre for Economic Policy Research DP No. 814 (Nov. 
1993).  They emphasize that policy in Western Europe offers an unfortunate and inappropriate guide for 
policymakers elsewhere. 
34Marek Dabrowski has called the farmer's lobby "probably the most anti-market oriented political group 
in Poland."  See Communist Economies and Economic Transition, Vol 4:1 (1992), p. 68. 
 
35This example is from Anders Aslund's forthcoming book on Russian reform. 32 
the engine of economic change for the country as a whole.   Given the much smaller share 
of workers in agriculture in Russia, one cannot expect a similar type of development.36  
Nonetheless, the important lesson for Russia is that the agricultural sector is not an 
appropriate focus for policy.   Agricultural efficiency will come only with a much broader 
process of rural development. 
 
                                                         
36For an insightful analysis of the differences between Russia and China, see Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing 
Thye Woo, "Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union", Economic Policy, 1994. 